INTRODUCTION
In an interview with the Washington Post, the Chinese President, Hu J'intao, declared that, "we will continue to expand people's democracy and build a socialist country under the rule of law in keeping with China's national conditions." 1 In addressing Parliament the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Wong Kan Seng, stated that "I believe that Singaporeans understand and support the fundamentals that have made Singapore what it is today. What are these fundamentals? The first fundamental is the rule of law." 2 Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation has recently stated that if we believe in the viability of our democratic institutions and will insistently develop them to make Russia a thriving society, based on principles of liberty and justice. We believe in the rule of law . . . . 3 It has been said that " [t] he beauty of the 'rule of law' is that it is neutral. No one-the human rights community, the business community, the Chinese leadership-objects to it." Indeed, human rights advocates believe that the rule 4 of law can prevent and remedy human rights abuses; security analysts believe that establishing the rule of law is crucial to rebuilding states plagued by internecine conflict; development experts assert that the rule of law is a 6 . See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-13 (1985) . Ronald Dworkin has aptly named these approaches the "rule-book" model and the "rights" model, respectively. Id. critical factor behind economic growth. No single political ideal has ever been so widely accepted and endorsed. While such universal support may 5 reasonably stem from the intrinsic value of law, it also comes from a certain elasticity of meaning. In fact, there are multiple definitions and understandings of the rule of law. This presents a challenge to the international community, where discussions about implementation can flounder because of a lack of a clear and widely accepted definition of the rule of law. What does it mean when a government pledges to uphold the rule of law? To what standard should it be held?
This article will discuss the conceptual approaches to defining the rule of law premised on two contemporary models: a formal definition and a substantive definition. Within the substantive approach to defining the rule 6 of law, the article discusses the variants between derogable and non-derogable rights. Where a non-derogable right is systematically threatened, curtailed, or derogated from, the rule of law cannot be said to exist. However, non-universal principles deemed to be derogable could be viewed as flexible, allowing a state to customize its interpretations in order to respect the interest of the community more widely, including the cultural values enshrined in that state. The article uses Singapore as an example of how this concept of derogable and non-derogable rights can be utilized to assess a state's adherence to the rule of law.
FORMAL APPROACH TO THE RULE OF LAW
At its core, a formal definition of the rule of law echoes Aristotle's dictum: government by laws and not of men. The essential premise is that a free state is characterized by the superiority and predictability of law, and by separation of powers-concepts that remain fundamental to contemporary definitions. The formal approach stresses the predictability of governance Hume, and John Locke all had a significant impact on the development of this approach to the rule of law. Their writings reinforced Aristotle's notion that 9 law should be superior, non-arbitrary, and enforceable by an independent judiciary, and should treat individuals equally. 10 However, it was A.V. Dicey, a British jurist and constitutional law theorist, who coined the phrase "rule of law" in 1885. Dicey emphasized 11 three principles of the rule of law: (1) no man is punishable "except for distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary court of land"; (2) "no man is above the law and all men are equal before the law"; and (3) "the general principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts." According to Dicey, the rule of 12 law is an effective "mechanism to restrain discretionary governmental action and protect citizens from arbitrary use of overly broad governmental power."
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Writing in the 1930s, American legal scholar Lon Fuller expanded on this definition by identifying eight procedural goals that the law should meet. These include: (1) laws must be general; (2) laws must be promulgated (publicity of the law); (3) except when necessary for the correction of the legal system; (4) laws should be clear and understandable; (5) the legal system must be free of contradictions; (6) laws cannot demand the impossible; (7) the law must be constant through time; and (8) there should be congruence between official action and declared rules. In effect, Fuller's definition can be seen 14 as a set of principles requiring that rules be established, that they be transparent and easily understood, and that they apply equally to all citizens. Although a number of scholars have interpreted Fuller's elements to be no more than functional "conditions of efficacy," Fuller has rejected such interpretations and insisted that his criteria are part of the very definition of the law. Joseph Raz, one of the most prominent living advocates of legal positivism, puts forth many of the same elements, but emphasizes the role of institutions and the importance of establishing limits on the arbitrary exercise of power. He believes that an independent judiciary must be guaranteed, courts must be accessible, and state actors should not have discretion to bend the law. Most importantly, however, Raz argues that the rule of law must not 16 be "confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man."
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For Raz, the rule of law should possess "no more than prima facie [sic] force." Raz is an unequivocal advocate of the formal approach, believing that 18 questions of morality belong outside the institutions and mechanisms of law and should be addressed through strong notions of legality rather than substantive legal norms. Laws do not cease to become laws simply because they are unjust. Herein lies the key divergence between the two approaches.
SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO THE RULE OF LAW
The problem with a strictly formal definition of the rule of law is that it provides no guidance vis-à-vis regimes that establish clear legal rules yet commit egregious human rights violations and flout international obligations. For example, Zimbabwe might well be characterized as a rule of law state; it has a clear and transparent legislative base supported by a judiciary that, although ineffective, could be seen as independent. It has an elected legislative branch. However, legislative edicts have authorized the murder, displacement, and torture of thousands of people, in violation of virtually every international human rights instrument in existence.
The same can be said of South Africa during the apartheid era. As Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of South Africa stated:
[t]he apartheid government, its officers and agents were accountable in accordance with the laws; the laws were clear; publicized and stable, and were upheld by law enforcement officials and judges. What was missing was the substantive component of the rule of law. The process by which the laws were made was not fair (only whites, a minority of the population, had the vote). And the laws themselves were not fair. They institutionalised discrimination, vested broad discretionary powers in Thus, the rule of law cannot mean simply a set of institutions, statutes, and procedures. It is not insignificant that early theorists of the rule of law were writing about democracies. What we find today, vis-à-vis many authoritarian states, is that basic legal standards and procedures are not sufficient to deter the arbitrary exercise of government power. In response to this, and in tandem with developments in international law, a substantive approach has gained new favor. This approach begins with formal definitions of law, but reaches beyond the letter and procedure of law to incorporate qualitative principles of justice.
Lord Tom Bingham of the United Kingdom is referred to as "the pre-eminent lawyer of his generation." He is one of the key international 21 scholars behind the substantive model. He first sets forth a formal definition of the rule of law, based on the core principle that "all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the courts." He then includes several additional 22 normative principles: clarity, limitation of discretion, equal application of the law to all, capability to appropriately resolve civil disputes, appropriate exercise of public powers, and fair adjudicative procedures. However, Lord
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Bingham acknowledges that such measures are not sufficiently comprehensive, and thus incorporates two additional elements, namely: adequate protection of human rights, and compliance by the state with its obligations in international law. By adding that the rule of law must include 24 protection of human rights and adherence to international law, he introduces a substantive component and also links the concept to modern international legal conventions. This approach is not without controversy. Supporters of the formal approach have argued that:
A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies . . . . It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it will excel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law.
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The counter-argument to Bingham clearly establishes the conflict between the two approaches to the rule of law. Citing the example of Nazi Germany, Lord Bingham maintains that a state "which savagely represses or persecutes sections of its people cannot . . . be regarded as observing the rule of law, even if the transport of the persecuted minority to the concentration camp . . . is the subject of detailed laws duly enacted and scrupulously observed." an independent, impartial judiciary; the presumption of innocence; the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay; a rational and proportionate approach to punishment; a strong and independent legal profession; strict protection of It is a rules-based system of self-government with a strong and accessible legal process. It features a system based on fair, publicised, broadly understood and stable laws; and diverse, competent and independent lawyers and judges. The rule of law is the foundation for sustainable communities and opportunities. 31 Moreover, the UN Secretary-General defines the rule of law with many of the same principles set forth by the IBA and the ABA. Although heavily reliant on a formal approach, there is an important recognition of substantive human rights principles. The Secretary-General defines the rule of law as:
[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (emphasis added). Development organizations have further weighed in with attempts to measure states' adherence to the rule of law. The World Bank, having emerged as a key actor in contemporary rule of law programming, has articulated a four-part test: "(1) the government itself is bound by the law; (2) all in society are treated equally under the law; (3) and the government authorities, including the judiciary, protect the human dignity of its citizens; and (4) justice is accessible for its citizens." sub-factors, including, for example, (1) governmental and non-governmental checks; (2) "clear, publicized" and "stable" laws; (3) property protection; (4) "fair and efficient" administration; (5) impartial judicial system; (6) compliance with international law; and (7) protection of fundamental rights. 36 The Index clearly and appropriately incorporates both formal and substantive standards. However, it gives equal weight to each factor and sub-factor. Thus, a country that scores exceptionally high on protecting property rights and providing alternative dispute resolution but low on protecting human rights could still end up with a relatively high weighted average on its final rule of law "score." This represents a major weakness of such quantitative measures.
An alternative approach that should be incorporated into the Index originates from John Rawls' theory of 'Justice as Fairness,' in which he proposes two principles. The first principle, relating to basic rights, is that 37 each person should have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate protection of basic liberties. The second principle relating to the redress of 38 social and economic inequality requires that there should be equality of opportunity for all, and that social and economic resources should be allocated to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. While the contents of his 39 principles are open to debate, the key aspect of Rawls' theory is that the 40 
NON-DEROGABLE/DEROGABLE RIGHTS
For me, it is appropriate that the standard for rule of law be based on a formal, procedural definition. However, without a strong substantive component that embraces universal principles of justice, the rule of law becomes meaningless. Indeed, a country that has a solid institutional legal framework but fails to protect fundamental human rights is at best a country ruled by the law but should not be considered a country based on the rule of law. And this is the paradigm shift that must occur. It is disingenuous to refer to a country as adhering to the rule of law when it fails to protect fundamental, substantive rights found in international law.
International sensibilities regarding fundamental rights have shifted. The impetus for this shift was the realization that state sovereignty has changed. 42 The once accepted doctrine that human rights law was the exclusive domain of the sovereign state is now dated. regarded as a concomitant principle of the rule of law. Indeed, this idea has gained broad currency; the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), multilateral treaties, international humanitarian law and many other human rights instruments have inextricably linked the protection of human rights to the rule of law. While there 46 continues to be debate about which rights and freedoms are "fundamental," certain principles contained within customary international law point to rights that must be protected. This body of rights should be viewed as transcending common law, civil law, and Islamic law. I recognize that a heavy emphasis on the substantive approach could be criticized for lacking practical application. Also, a broad rights-based approach could pose problems in certain non-Western cultures, where concepts of "justice" and "human rights" may be understood and applied differently than in Western, Anglo-American societies. However, I suggest that such objections can be overcome if we distinguish between principles from which derogation is never appropriate, and principles that might allow compromise according to local values and customs.
Substantive rights would thus be broken down into categories of derogable and non-derogable rights. For instance, in the specific context of multilateral human rights treaties, derogation is a formal and often legislative process. States can refuse to enforce a certain right, to the extent that this limitation is strictly necessary in response to a pressing emergency that threatens the life of a nation. However, even in national emergencies, these 47 treaties delineate certain freedoms which may not be curtailed; as a result, these specific, listed rights are often labelled "non-derogable." Thus, where 48 a non-derogable right is systematically breached, curtailed, or derogated from, the rule of law cannot be said to exist.
However, non-universal principles deemed to be derogable could be flexible, except where a state's method of penalty is so severe that it strips citizens of the fundamental, non-derogable right to rational and proportionate punishment. There is no doubt that to denote all fundamental rights as non-derogable would produce much disagreement. As Lord Bingham puts it, there is "an element of vagueness about the content" of fundamental rights, "since the outer edges of fundamental human rights are not clear-cut." However, he 49 goes on to note that "there will ordinarily be a measure of agreement on where the lines are to be drawn" and that "[t]he rule of law must, surely, require legal protection of such human rights." 50 Indeed, it is doubtful that the international community can, in the short run, reach full consensus on this issue. However, I think the international community can get very close. I believe it is both possible and crucial to identify principles and guarantees from which no state should be permitted to derogate.
For me, non-derogable rights are those rights that are internationally accepted as jus cogens norms. The very fact that there is consensus on these norms solidifies their status in international law. Thus, a jus cogens norm that prohibits the breach of a certain right is strong evidence of that right's fundamental importance. Of course, determining which rights attain the non-derogable status is not without its own complexities, but there are reliable indicators as to the gravity of a right. For instance, multilateral rights treaties often implicitly create a hierarchy of rights by qualifying some, and not others. This is by no means a perfect method of differentiation, but it is a 51 useful starting point. However, it is important to stress that a jus cogens norm is mandatory upon states and cannot be abnegated, subverted, or weakened by any unilateral state action. Nor can states attempt to alter their adherence to these inviolable norms because of perceived cultural, regional, or national differences (e.g., from an Islamic, Western, or Asian perspective). The reason is that non-derogable rights bind all nations; a state's breach of any one of them is unlawful.
The following is not intended to be an exhaustive list of non-derogable rights, but a starting point. 
NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS

The right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
The prohibition on torture is enshrined in numerous international law instruments including the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and state that the prohibition against torture is a jus cogens norm. In short, the 57 use of torture is an anathema to the idea that individuals must be treated with dignity.
A state that permits torture must be seen as in breach of the rule of law because the authority upon which the state operates disappears completely when it violates this fundamental protected right. One of the most poignant and insightful defences of this principle came in a 1999 decision by Israel's Supreme Court, which rejected the government's position that the use of torture against Palestinian detainees was justified in certain instances. 61. BINGHAM, supra note 22, at 90. 62. It should be noted that the ICCPR permits derogation of this right in times of public emergency. However, this does not detract from its fundamental nature under the rule of law. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 14. See also ECHR, supra note 47, art. 6; UDHR, supra note 46, art. 10.
63. ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 14, para. 1. 64. Id. at art.14, para. 2. 65. Id. at art.14, para. 3.
understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties. (emphasis added).
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The prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment is often coupled with the prohibition on torture. Respect for both of these 60 norms is fundamental to the concept of human dignity. Thus, the right not to be tortured or subjected to other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment falls squarely within the definition of a non-derogable right; it is of clear importance and its prohibition is internationally accepted. Its status as a jus cogens norm and its prevalence within multilateral treaties places it as a right that is binding on all states and that is a necessary component of the rule of law.
The right to a fair trial
The right to a fair trial is intimately tied to notions of equality and protection against the arbitrary use of coercive power. Indeed, it has been referred to as a "cardinal requirement" of the rule of law. The right to a fair trial is "a well-established rule of customary international law, and in the view of many, has the status of a peremptory norm of general international law." Derogation from this principle should be 66 a per se violation. It is, therefore, a non-derogable right essential to the rule of law.
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion should similarly be regarded as fundamental to the rule of law. These are elemental aspects of identity for which many have given their lives. The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is also integral to the preservation of equality and dignity. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated that this right is now a norm of customary international law that may not be the subject of a reservation to the ICCPR. 67 Article 18(1) of the ICCPR states that:
[E]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. limitation. Only manifestations that are damaging to the public good can be curtailed. The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is reflected in regional treaties.
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There is global agreement on the existence of the right, and it is clearly of fundamental importance. It is, therefore, a non-derogable right within the definition espoused above.
The right to non-discrimination
Discrimination strikes at the very heart of the concept of equality and is clearly antithetical to the rule of law. Provisions in the UDHR and ICCPR expressly forbid discrimination. This is also widely reflected in regional within the definition set out for a non-derogable right and should be central to the rule of law.
The right not to be punished disproportionately
The right not to be punished disproportionately may at first appear to be a simple application of a group of other rights, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life or liberty. However, it has an important and distinctive function within the concept of non-derogable rights. It is, of course, true that there are some rights-those which can be qualified-where states will reasonably disagree as to the proper purview of their power. For instance, different jurisdictions can and do take different stances on the issue of national service. National service is, in a strict sense, a limitation on the right to liberty. However, we would not readily conceive of this practice as a breach of the rule of law.
However, if we take as an example, a person imprisoned for life as a result of failing to fulfill the obligation of national service, such a punishment would not only be disproportionate, but also a breach of a non-derogable right. This would not be because of undue restrictions on personal liberty, but because the punishment was so severe and disproportionate that it stripped the individual of more fundamental rights. Similarly, sentencing a woman to death by stoning for adultery would be disproportionate because of the non-violent nature of the crime. Article 6(2) of the ICCPR is clear that "in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes." Actions relating to moral values such as 80 adultery would not reach the level of a "serious crime" under international legal standards.
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I submit that international agreement on these principles does exist. Qualified rights under the ICCPR must only be limited in a manner which is "necessary" for specific, listed instances of the collective good. The 82 language of the ICCPR is reiterated in many regional treaties. Disproportionate punishments are, by definition, more invasive than necessary and are thus a breach. Therefore, the right not to be disproportionately punished is both of clear substantive importance and is internationally agreed upon. It falls within the definition of a non-derogable right.
THE NEED FOR DEROGABLE RIGHTS
As indicated earlier, there are other substantive principles less widely agreed upon and therefore lacking the full force of international law. On these principles, derogation should be possible and compromise may be appropriate in order to respect the interests of the community more widely, including cultural values enshrined in individual states.
For example, while Western societies typically understand human rights as fundamentally based on individual liberty, many states put a premium on group rights, which may include the rights of the state or nation. In such a scheme, a strong government may "subsume individual liberties to community interests to maintain public order." For example, proponents of the "Asian Some may question whether a presumptive bias toward the collective interests of society at the expense of individual civil-political rights violates the principle of individual liberty, and in turn the rule of law. I would argue that such a presumption is not a prima facie violation of the rule of law, but that a state's method of punishment for violations is determinative.
For example, a state may enact strict laws prohibiting the defamation of political figures. While freedom of speech could rightly be considered a fundamental principle under the rule of law, a state that enforces strict defamation laws does not necessarily violate the rule of law. International covenants allow for some restrictions on the exercise of free speech if they are prescribed by law and are "necessary in a democratic society in the interests However, there is not yet consensus on the abolition of the death penalty to conclude that its use is a breach of a non-derogable right. While I do not support the death penalty, and indeed wish to see it abolished, it remains legal under international law. Thus, the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life does not cover circumstances where an individual is sentenced to the death penalty in accordance with the law (although there are limits regarding the method of execution, length of detention, and proportionality of punishment).
SINGAPORE
Singapore provides an interesting example of how the concept of derogable and non-derogable rights can be used to assess a state's adherence to the rule of law. The legal system in Singapore is based upon English common law, which was introduced during British colonial rule. Singapore adopted a written constitution containing a bill of rights, as well as provisions religious beliefs forbid them from entering military service, Singapore's failure to take this into account is discriminatory. Punishing a Jehovah's Witness for failing to do national service is, therefore, a breach of the non-derogable right not to be discriminated against.
Singapore has also been criticized for harsh defamation laws that violate freedom of expression. The government has made violation of these laws both a criminal and a civil offense, punishable by up to two years in prison, harsh uncapped fines, or both. This is a good example of a case in which punishment for a crime offers a more useful measure of the rule of law than the law itself. Singapore's strict defamation laws may not breach the rule of law-even by substantive definitions. However, the punishment for violating such laws is more problematic.
The IBA has noted that the criminalization of defamation laws is inappropriate because criminal law is reserved for acts that affect society as a whole. Defamation law, by contrast, typically involves disputes between 116 private parties, so that the application of civil law is more appropriate. In Singapore, however, civil defamation laws have long been used as an instrument to prevent criticism, stifle political opposition and maintain a climate of political intimidation. It remains a tool to unjustifiably limit 117 freedom of expression and undermine peoples' capacity to oppose the government.
By imposing fines for acts of defamation, Singapore has created a culture of "self-censorship" that has stripped citizens of other fundamental rights. For example, according to Singapore's Constitution, potential candidates [for elections] are ineligible to stand if they have been convicted of criminal defamation and thereby either imprisoned for one year or fined $2,000 or more, or if they have been charged in a civil suit with damages so large as to bankrupt them. Because fines for defamation are often uncapped, they 118 frequently leave individuals bankrupt and have become a tool "more effective than the threat of imprisonment." on numerous occasions following the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression. He was brought to court, found guilty of defamation suits brought against him by ruling party leaders, heavily fined and thereby forced into bankruptcy. Because Singapore law does not permit an individual in bankruptcy to participate in elections, exorbitant defamation fines serve to silence the opposition. In some cases, punishment for criminal defamation is arguably severe enough to eviscerate any pretence of the right to freedom of expression.
In a recent case, Alan Shadrake, aged 75, was convicted by the High Court in Singapore on charges of criminal defamation, through a finding of contempt for "scandalising the judiciary" in his latest publication: Once A Jolly Hangman: Singapore Justice in the Dock. His book criticized the 120 Singapore use of the death penalty. His arrest was made pursuant to a 121 complaint lodged by the Media Development Authority (MDA), the Singaporean government body responsible for censoring publications and broadcasts.
The Court ruled that the book scandalized the judiciary by casting doubt on the impartiality, integrity, and independence of Singapore's judiciary. The violations of freedom of expression are further compounded by Singapore's failure to uphold the right to a fair trial. District Court judges do not enjoy security of tenure, and Supreme Court judges, the Attorney-General, and the Chief Justice enjoy security of tenure only until the age of 65, following which they are dependent upon the President, if he concurs with the advice of the Prime Minister, to extend their services for such period as the President sees fit. As a result, there is a reasonable inference that political 125 compliance could be a condition for judges to keep their judicial positions.
This problem manifests itself most clearly in politically-charged cases, and particularly the above-mentioned criminal defamation cases, initiated by the governing People's Action Party, in which judges exercise their broad discretion in awarding judgment and damages, resulting in substantially greater awards of damages being made than in non-political defamation claims. An article written in 2007 claimed " [t] he Lee family and other top 126 127 government officials have an unbroken record of victories in defamation suits against political opponents and publications who have been critical of them."
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For example, Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, a former leader of the Worker's Party, Member of Parliament and Senior District Judge, was prosecuted in several cases between 1986 and 2001 for misuse of party funds and defamation, and appealed against bankruptcy orders against him. Many of these trials provoked comments from the international community regarding failures in fair trial standards and independence of the judiciary. An International Commission of Jurists trial observer noted that "the Court was unduly compliant to the government" and that the finding of malice resulting in the verdict of defamation was "insupportable and highly indicative of the Court's bias."
Additional attention was drawn to alleged 129 politically-motivated charges against Mr. Jeyaretnam in a report issued by Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada. The report stated that " [t] he dominant purpose of the [case] appeared to be to prevent Mr Jeyaretnam from further criticising the government of Singapore and to remove him from public office," demonstrating the political motivations behind the actions brought against him. 130 
CONCLUSION
It is sometimes said that the Rule of Law has so many meanings that it actually has no meaning. However, there must be a standard against which to measure state performance, and I believe there exists sufficient common ground upon which to base a workable definition. Starting from a formal approach is both necessary and appropriate. Scholars will continue to debate the nuances of procedural definitions, but the real controversy concerns whether and how substantive principles of human rights and justice should be incorporated into definitions of the rule of law.
I argue that a definition should include fundamental principles of justice, but that such principles should be defined within one of two categories-derogable and non-derogable rights. While certain principles are universal, from which derogation is never permissible, other principles are arguably less essential and may be compromised according to local value and custom. Certainly there is room for debate within the two categories, and I do not deny the arbitrary and capricious ways in which states can abuse the legal system. However, by highlighting areas in which compromise may be possible, we create an approach where there is broad agreement about what constitutes the rule of law, while simultaneously respecting local values and cultures.
It is important to stress that a country that fails to protect a non-derogable principle would not be designated as a country upholding the rule of law. There should be no sliding scale or allowance for good performance in some other areas. When we incorporate substantive norms into a sharpened definition of good governance, non-derogable rights become fundamental pillars of the rule of law. This approach is a corrective to indices that attempt to measure everything yet obfuscate the failure to protect fundamental rights. This is the paradigm shift that must occur in our understanding and promotion of the rule of law.
Countries cannot and should not be seen as embracing the rule of law simply because they champion economic and commercial liberalism. Without a full and unambiguous commitment to substantive, non-derogable rights these countries are failing to abide by the rule of law.
